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FINANCIAL GUIDELINES FOR INVESTING IN
MOTION PICTURE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS
L.M. Farrell t
I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF RECENT HISTORY OF MOTION
PICTURE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP SYNDICATIONS
In the early 1980's, motion picture syndicators, in association with
major Wall Street brokerage firms, aggressively promoted the sale of
shares or units in Motion Picture Limited Partnership Syndications
(MPLPS's) to small investors. Priced between $1,000 and $15,000 a
share, MPLPS units were often purchased on the basis of tax shelter ben-
efits or glamour with little consideration of the economic viability of the
underlying film project. In apparent disregard of much of traditional in-
vestment analysis criteria, the sale of MPLPS's was well received by the
market. Between 1982 and 1985, more than $750,000,000 in investor
equity was raised through MPLPS unit offerings.'
The original Silver Screen Partnership (Silver Screen I), marketed
by E.F. Hutton and Dean Witter, was capitalized at $75,000,000. How-
ever, it was so well received by the market that it was over-subscribed by
$8,000,000 and raised $83,000,000 between May and July of 1983.2 Ini-
tial cash disbursements to the limited partners began quickly. Investors
who invested $10,000 in the offering had received $1,200 in cash as of
May 1985, and home video and foreign sales were expected to produce
$4,800 by the second quarter of 1986.'
The first Delphi Partnership (Delphi I), brought to market by Mer-
rill Lynch, Dean Witter and Blyth Eastman Paine Webber, raised
$60,000,000 in units of $5,000 for the production of sixteen films in a
t L.M. Farrell is Professor of Finance and Economics at the Universit6 du Quebec i
Trois-Rivi~res, Quebec, Canada. He received his Ph.D. from the Graduate School of Manage-
ment at the University of California, Los Angeles; Master of Mathematics from the University
of Waterloo in Ontario; B.Sc. in Physics from Carleton University in Ottawa; and a B.A. in
Mathematics and Economics from the University of Toronto. © by L.M. Farrell 1991.
1. Martin A. Grove, Is Hollywood a Good Investment?, HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug. 13,
1985, at F-4.
2. Id
3. Laura Landro, Movie Partnerships Offer a Little Glitz, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1985, at
15.
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joint venture with Columbia Pictures and Tri-Star Pictures.4 Initial titles
included Annie, Blue Thunder, The Toy (with Richard Pryor), and the
mega-hits Tootsie (starring Dustin Hoffman) and Ghostbusters Partici-
pants who invested $10,000 in Delphi I in 1982 began receiving cash
payments thirteen months later. In addition to a $7,000 tax deduction in
1982-1983 and a $700 investment tax credit, $4,000 in cash had been
returned as of May 1985.5
The Tax Reform Act of 19866 removed much of the tax shelter pre-
viously enjoyed by Motion Picture Limited Partnerships (MPLP's) such
as Silver Screen I and Delphi I. The future marketability of motion pic-
ture investment projects depends on how well Wall Street and the syndi-
cation industry can develop motion picture investment packages at
sufficiently low costs to make them attractive to investors. In the absence
of significant tax shelter advantages, film projects must be evaluated in
terms of their economic viability.
The purpose of this article is to provide a set of practical guidelines
which can be used by individual investors to analyze the financial feasi-
bility of MPLPS's. Simple capital budgeting techniques, which can also
be used to analyze limited partnership syndications in areas such as real
estate, gas and oil, are applied to determine the probability that the in-
vestment will realize a positive net present value, and to project possible
internal rates of return, before and after tax.7 This article discusses the
financing and/or participation relationship between the general partner
and the limited partner.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
INVESTMENT VEHICLE
MPLPS offerings can be valued by applying the capital budgeting
techniques used to analyze the limited partnership syndications of other
types of assets such as real estate, oil and gas exploration, scientific re-
search projects, and livestock.8
Generally, syndication may be considered a generic term applied to
any form of organization or relationship which allows two or more inves-
tors to participate in the ownership of a single asset. Syndication is not a
4. David Weber, You Ought to Be in Movies or Should You?, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1983, at
48.
5. Landro, supra note 3.
6. 26 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
7. PETER LuSZIlG ET AL., GESTION FINANCIPRE 180 (1983).
8. J. FRED WESTON & THOMAS F. COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 99 (8th ed.
1986).
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legal form of entity, but is commonly classified as a form of ownership as
well as a method of financing and marketing investments. Any real es-
tate project organized under a multi-person form of ownership can be
considered a syndication. Commentators treat real estate syndication as
simply one form of equity financing, noting that capital budgeting tech-
niques can be used to analyze syndications as well as individual and insti-
tutional investment decisions. 9
The term syndication implies the fractionalization of the interest in
the underlying asset."° The relationship which exists among the individ-
ual investors and between the investors and the interest in the underlying
asset is defined in the syndication contract. In the simple syndicate
structure (Diagram 1), there are two assets: the underlying asset owned
by the syndicate and the investment units owned by the investors. In-
vestment units represent a fractionalized ownership in the underlying as-
set, rather than direct ownership of the asset itself.
DIAGRAM 1: A SIMPLE SYNDICATE
F 1 Ownership - [ Acquisition Interest in
Individual __ Investment ___ Syndicate I Underlying
Investors Units ion Asset
The exact characteristics of the investment units are determined by
the form or organizational structure of the syndicate. In the case of real
estate syndications, this structure is based on six types of legal relation-
ships: co-ownership, divided ownership, corporation, trust, general part-
nership and limited partnership. Only the corporation is treated as a
separate legal entity; the remaining five options constitute legal relation-
ships which exist among investors as specified in agreements or as estab-
lished in governing statutes.
The limited partnership syndicate is a popular form of ownership
because it offers the investor the limited legal liability similar to a corpo-
ration, as well as the tax benefits of a partnership, such as pass-through
of tax losses and capital gains."1 The unlimited liability for debts and
obligations is assumed by the general partner. However, to retain the
limited liability status, limited partners cannot take an active role in the
management of the investment project. Another disadvantage is that the
9. STEPHEN A. PYHRR & JAMES R. COOPER, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 213, 410
(1982).
10. Stanley Hamilton, Real Estate Syndications, REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS AND AP-
PRAISAL XII.1, XII.2 (Dominique Achour ed., 1987).
11. PYHRR & COOPER, supra note 9, at 213.
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partnership, and not the individual partners, decide the amount of depre-
ciation taken in a given year. This may not be in the best interest of a
particular investor.
A. Basic Components of a Syndicate
There are three types of participants in a syndication. The syndica-
tor or promotor initiates the project, creates the syndicate, purchases and
develops the initial underlying asset, and markets the syndicate invest-
ment units to investors. The syndicate manager, often the syndicator,
manages the ongoing syndicate project, including the reporting and ac-
counting functions. The investor provides equity capital and bears some
of the investment risk of the syndicate. In exchange, the investor expects
a return on capital, as well as the return of his or her investment. 
12
In the entertainment sector, the syndicator and the syndicate man-
ager are often the same. As a result, a number of limited partners com-
plain about the timeliness and quality of reported information from the
syndicate manager. A recent example of problems with reporting is the
lawsuit involving Paramount Pictures. Columnist Art Buchwald sued
the studio over property rights to the film Coming to America, starring
Eddie Murphy. 3 One of the key issues was whether the film had earned
a profit. Paramount argued that despite more than $250,000,000 in
worldwide box office receipts, the film lost money. Attorneys for Buch-
wald objected to the inclusion of studio overhead and other expenses
which reduced net income to zero. 4 Prospective MPLP investors should
be wary of syndications which base participation payouts on net, rather
than gross, revenues.
B. Syndication Value
Syndications are formed for a variety of reasons. One popular view
is that the process of syndication can add value to the underlying asset,
so that the value of the sum of all investment units is greater than the
value of the underlying asset.'5 To the extent that the market for invest-
ment units is inefficient, this may be correct and raises an interesting
question for future research.
Little is known regarding the profitability of many film-related lim-
12. Hamilton, supra note 10, at XII.4.
13. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C 706 083, 1990 Cal. App. Lexis 634
(Cal. App. Dept. Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Jan. 31, 1990).
14. Judge Warns He Might Force Paramount to Open Its Books, L.A. DAILY NEWS, re-
printed in MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 7, 1990, at 48.
15. Hamilton, supra note 10, at XI[.2.
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ited partnerships. By comparison, operating data on a typical JMB
Properties Ltd. partnership involving real estate, sold by Merrill Lynch
in the mid-1970's, shows that each $1,000 investment provided ordinary
deductions of $2,770, capital gains of $361, and return of capital of
$765.1 6 Real estate limited partnerships sold publicly through major bro-
kerage houses were originally intended for a predominantly tax shelter-
oriented market and promised large write-offs for high tax bracket inves-
tors. 17 Recently, however, many limited partnerships were offered to in-
vestors seeking income and appreciation, as well as tax shelter benefits."
A major advantage of limited partnerships is the ability to use lever-
age and tax benefits to maximize return through the purchase of a small
interest in large diversified portfolios. 9 In the United States, the tax ad-
vantages have been reduced as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.20
In other countries, such as Canada, significant tax advantages, including
tax credits which exceed the unit nominal value, still exist.2
III. MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
Motion Picture Production and Development (MPPD) investment
projects are traditionally divided into two basic categories, that of small
and large investors, depending on the amount of investment, the level of
investor sophistication, and the investment return criteria.
A. Investor Sophistication
Small investors usually invest from $1,000 to $15,000.22 Major Wall
Street brokerage firms, such as Merrill Lynch and Dean Witter, who are
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and mar-
ket nationally, offer that type of MPLP units to the public. The general
partner here is the syndicator who is responsible for management deci-
sions and is liable for obligations incurred by the partnership. The lim-
ited partners have no immediate control over the films selected for
financing, the deals cut, fees, costs, or remuneration to the main talent.
The liability of each limited partner is limited to the amount of the initial
investment.
16. PYHRR & COOPER, supra note 9, at 694.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 694-695.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
21. Prospectus, Syndicate de Film XIV, Soci&i en Commandite, Nov. 12, 1990.
22. Grove, supra note 1; see also supra notes 7, 10.
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In the past, the limited partnership was structured as a tax-shelter-
ing report rather than a tax-paying entity. A major attraction to many
investors was the flow-through to the individual partners of the tax con-
sequences of fast non-cash expensing and crediting. With the removal of
the tax benefits, the breadth and reliability of revenue forecasts became
more important in assessing the economic feasibility of proposed
projects.
Large investors, less interested in glamour than profit, invest in film
projects up to $500,000 per unit, usually through private placement.23
They want the best return on invested capital. Every investor, large or
small, is looking for another Star Wars or Dances with Wolves. However,
when a lucrative deal does come up, it is usually kept inside. The small
investor does not get offered a piece of Star Wars. The sweeter deals go
into private placements which are easier to manage and which constitute
the prime market for film financing.24
B. Revenues
In general, domestic theatre revenues may account for as little as
forty percent of total film revenues.25 Thus, even if a film does not be-
come a box office hit, the downside risk is somewhat reduced. The intro-
duction of special incentives when some studios guarantee the return of
the initial investment, or turn over their distribution fees if the partners
are in danger of losing money, further reduces the risk of movie packages
investment.26
C. Risk Management
The absence of objective, reliable data on the past performance of
motion picture production and development projects complicates the
23. Grove, supra note 1, at F-6.
24. David Alan Evans, Reel Risk BARRONS, Jan. 9, 1984, at 56; see also Weber, supra note
4, at 69.
25. Film revenues are derived from the following sources:
1) Domestic Theatre receipts 40%
2) Video Cassette sales 5%
3) Pay Cable TV sales 15%
4) Foreign Theatre receipts 24%
5) Network TV 9%
6) Syndicated TV 5%
7) Ancillary 2%
TOTAL 100%
Interview with an independent producer, Los Angeles, spring 1986.
26. Grove, supra note 1, at F-6; see also Landro, supra note 3, at 15; Evans, supra note 24,
at 56.
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measurement of the risk/return trade-off of film projects. Additionally,
film deals are non-homogeneous properties that embody a large non-sys-
tematic risk component. There is no guarantee that even a superstar's
next film will be a money-making hit for its backers.
Successful investors are skilled at managing risk as well as managing
money. Managing risk does not necessarily mean risk avoidance but
rather the development of skills necessary to identify risk and cope with
it. Three general techniques are available to manage business and finan-
cial risk: avoiding or eliminating risk, transferring or shifting risk, and
reducing the remaining risk." MPLP investors should determine
whether the expected returns compensate for the risk involved; when re-
structuring cannot correct the problem, they should reject the
investment.
The limited partnership structure transfers unlimited liability and
the responsibility for cash calls to the general partner.2" This shifts an
external financial risk from the limited partners to the general partner.
For a certain cost, static business risk can also be shifted. The vehicles
for such a shift include insurance policies and completion bonds, which
reduce the risk of cost overruns, and distribution contracts, which can be
used as collateral for a production loan.
The remaining risk to the limited partners can be minimized as well.
Negotiating better purchase terms which include lower equity investment
exposure reduces business risk.29 The right to audit, good accounting
controls, and a reliable reporting system allow problems to be identified
as they occur, and corrective action to be taken more quickly to reduce
expenses.30
Investment in a well-constructed MPLP package of several pictures
can achieve a degree of risk reduction by diversifying the invested capital
across a number of films.3 ' Risk is reduced by cross-collateralizing all of
the films financed in the film portfolio. The risk reduction is not costless,
but is achieved at the price of reduced return in the event of a mega-hit
film.
Blind pools represent one attempt to diversify risk. In a blind pool,
money is raised first and then the general partner selects the films to be
financed or acquired.3 2 This arrangement is more desirable for the gen-
27. PYHRR & COOPER, supra note 9, at 331.
28. Weber, supra note 4, at 48; see also PHYRR & COOPER, supra note 9, at 330.
29. PYHRR & COOPER, supra note 9, at 331.
30. Id
31. Weber, supra note 4, at 48.
32. Id at 48-49.
19921
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eral partner but less so for the limited partners: it may give the general
partner more leeway in cutting a deal, which benefits the general partner
at the expense of the limited partners. Investment in a pre-selected film
package lowers the risk borne by the limited partners by allowing them
to evaluate the potential of a project.33
Investment in film packages on a gross receipt basis is less risky than
in projects which receive payments based on net receipts, all other things
being equal. This is because investors receive a percentage of the gross
and are almost always in some positive cash flow position.34
A "less than purchase" participation in a film project is another way
to reduce risk.3- For example, providing the advertising funds on a film
in exchange for a percentage of the return presents less of a risk to an
investor. Usually, however, it is not a primary profit generator. For ex-
ample, Angeles Cinema Investors paid $6,300,000 of advertising costs on
a package of films, including Academy Award winner Chariots of Fire,
but earned only nine percent from the short-term deal.36
In the absence of objective data, subjective judgment must be used
to quantify the risk of investing in film projects. Estimates of the failure
rate in the film business range from high to astronomical.37 In 1981,
approximately eighty percent of the films released in the United States
lost money.38 A vice president of a major California bank responsible for
motion picture loans estimates that of any ten pictures, seven will lose
money, two will break even, and one will make money.39 Typically, a
picture costing $5,000,000 could generate the distribution of gross reve-
nues presented in Table 1. Approximately seventy-five percent of gross
revenues is earned in the first year; the percentages over the remaining
six years are fifteen, five, two, one, one, and one. 4°
33. Iad at 48.
34. Id. at 49, 69.
35. Id.
36. Weber, supra note 4, at 69.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 49.
39. See supra note 25.
40. Id.
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TABLE 1: PROJECTED TOTAL GRoss REVENUE
Outcome Probability Total Projected
Gross Revenue
(Exluding Residual Value)
Good .1 $25,000,000
Normal .2 $15,000,000
Poor .3 $ 5,000,000
D. Marketability, Residual Investment Value and Government
Regulation
Marketability risk, which refers to the potential decline in value
when the asset is sold, is related to the breadth and depth of the market
for that asset.41 As is the case for many other types of limited partner-
ships which invest in real estate, race horses, or gas and oil drilling, a
liquidity risk exists. Once the investment is made, there is often no mar-
ket for the units to be resold at any price.42
An exceptional film may realize a quick residual value if the studio
is anxious to buy back the partnership shares, often after the tax benefits
have been passed through to the limited partners.43 However, the price
which the studio must pay to buy back the film becomes an issue. At
present, there is no commonly accepted valuation method which can be
used to establish the residual value of the film project at the start. This
article suggests that the film's residual value can be calculated. The as-
sumption is that the film will earn constant revenues after a certain
number of years, usually seven, which can be capitalized as a
perpetuity.44
This assumption is not unreasonable, given the demand for software
in the video industry. The recent purchase of MCA Universal Studios by
Japanese hardware manufacturer Matsushita, owner of Panasonic,
Quasar, and Technics, has been seen by many as a way for Matsushita to
ensure an immensely valuable supply of video software.45 Movies,
records, and films in studio archives, all can be played on Matsushita
equipment.
41. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 8, at 300.
42. Weber, supra note 4, at 70.
43. This has encouraged critics to comment that profitable film investment projects sold to
the general public are merely interest-free loans to the studios. See Grove, supra note 1; see
also supra notes 3, 4, 24.
44. See supra note 25.
45. Janice Castro, Let Us Entertain You, TIME, Dec. 10, 1990, at 48.
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In an attempt to protect investors from adverse economic conse-
quences, the SEC, as well as the various state securities commissions,
have established approved income and net worth levels at which a partic-
ular offering might represent a suitable risk for prospective investors.'
The approved income and net worth levels must be specified by the pro-
ject sponsors in the offering prospectus.
For example, the Delphi I project (1982), which raised $60,000,000
in units of $5,000, required that investors have a net worth, excluding
home, furnishings and automobiles, of $150,000 and some income taxa-
ble at the federal level at the fifty percent rate.47 Angeles Cinema Inves-
tors raised $10,800,000 through an issue in which units were sold at
$1,000 each with a minimum purchase of three units.48 In most states,
participation was permitted if the prospective investor could prove a net
worth of $30,000 and an annual gross income of $30,000. 49
IV. CRITICAL DATA AND MODEL
A. Critical Data
A number of important factors must be evaluated in considering a
project's potential. The track record of the people involved is perhaps
the most important variable in assessing the economic viability of a film
project. The director is especially important because he or she is basi-
cally responsible for bringing the project in on budget and on time.50
Another factor crucial to the success of the project is the nature of
the production itself.5 Initially, the MPLP's were confined to movies
that would appeal to the general entertainment market and that could be
easily edited for network television. More recently, the rapid growth of
the video cassette and cable markets for adult viewers has encouraged the
formation of MPLP's for the production of X-rated sex films.
The primary source of information for the prospective investor is a
prospectus.52 In addition to fulfilling the requirements specified by the
state and federal regulating authorities, the prospectus should also con-
46. In California, investor suitability is determined by examining the individual applica-
tion for syndication. An attempt is made to determine how risky the prospective investment is,
as well as to assess other risk factors, such as financing, rights of limited partners, conflict of
interest in terms of the upfront compensation to the syndication sponsor, and creative talent.
See Weber, supra note 4, at 69-70.
47. Weber, supra note 4, at 48, 69.
48. Id. at 47-48.
49. Id. at 69.
50. Grove, supra note 1, at F-3.
51. Id.; see also Weber, supra note 4, at 48.
52. Appendix, Figure 1.
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tain an estimated production schedule, 3 an estimated production
budget, 4 and a pro forma income statement."
Contracts with the main talent are extremely important in develop-
ing the pro forma income statement because they specify how profits are
defined.5 6 For example, the Delphi I partnership owned forty percent of
the film Tootsie, starring Dustin Hoffman. Although the film earned ap-
proximately $173,000,000 in the first year of release, the partnership re-
ceived only $27,700,000. 7 Contracts with Hoffman, director Sydney
Pollack and the producer specified a priority claim in the distribution of
profits of thirty percent of gross revenues. An additional seventeen and
one-half percent, or $30,300,000, was paid to Columbia in distribution
fees. Another twelve and one-half percent of gross, or $21,600,000, was
distributed as residual payments to other actors. The partnership re-
ceived forty percent of the remaining $69,200,000, or $27,700,000.58
Another essential component in evaluating a film's potential success
is the quality of the screenplay.59 Many movies are financed six to twelve
months before filming, and often some eighteen months before the film is
released. Appraising the market potential of a film before it is produced
or released is extremely speculative even for professionals. The market is
driven by popular taste and fads. It may move away from the product
during the production period. Often an informed, honest appraisal of the
value of a film at the time of purchase may substantially over- or under-
estimate the income eventually derived from the film.
Other significant factors in assessing the viability of a film project
are the purchase of a completion bond, terms of a distribution contract,
and the right to audit. Although a completion bond is not always re-
quired, it provides a guarantee which reduces the risk of cost overruns.'
The film distribution contract can be used as collateral for a production
loan.6' The right to audit is an important component of a syndication
agreement because it specifies the conditions under which investors can
examine the books of the project.62
The tax aspects of many film deals can be very complicated and
53. Id at Figure 2.
54. Id at Figure 3.
55. Id at Figure 4.
56. Evans, supra note 24, at 56.
57. Id at 56.
58. Id at 56-57.
59. Id. at 56.
60. Grove, supra note 1, at F-3.
61. Id; see also supra notes 3, 24.
62. See PYHRR & COOPER, supra note 9.
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require professional advice. Two comments are made in passing. Under
pre-revision tax law, investors in film projects who wished to claim tax
deductions had to be "at risk" financially in order to qualify.63 Investors
interested in the investment tax credit usually requested a SEC ruling or
opinion of counsel to ensure conformity with the rigorous standards re-
quired. An investment tax credit of up to ten percent of qualified pro-
duction costs was available to taxpayers who had an ownership interest
in the film at the time the film was first placed in service." However,
once exhibited before an audience for which it was created, the film was
considered "used," and no tax credit was available to the subsequent
buyers. This often benefited the film distributor, rather than the in-
dependent producer or investor. Prospective investors should satisfy
themselves that all tax benefits (but not liabilities), flow through the part-
nership to the individual partners.
Depreciation is another important factor to consider. The income-
forecast method is commonly used to calculate depreciation in film in-
vestment projects.6- This method of depreciation distributes the
purchase price across the economic life of the film on the basis of the
percentage of total revenue received in a given year. The depreciation in
any year, t, can be calculated:
Total Receipt for Taxable Year t
Depreciation in Year t = Purchase Price of Film X Total Receipt sTaed tTotal Net Receipt Estimated to Be
Earned During Useful Film Life.
Although the residual value of a project has some significance, most
film investors do not take the residual or windup value of the project into
consideration when they buy into a deal. The residual value of a film can
be estimated, based on the assumption that after a certain number of
years the film will earn a constant revenue which can be capitalized as a
perpetuity.66 In recent years, with the rise in the demand for video
software, the residual value has tended to increase. The residual value
can be calculated:
Residual Value = Constant Remaining Perpetuity Cash Flow
Discount Rate
where the discount rate is the rate of return earned on investments of
comparable risk.
Other information included in the offering prospectus should in-
63. 26 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
64. Grove, supra note 1, at F-4.
65. Id.
66. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 8, at 691.
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clude liquidity data, such as the conditions under which funds can be
borrowed to cover production costs and management fees, as well as the
interest rate to be paid on such debt; minimum cash balances necessary
to maintain the operation of the project; and provisions regarding the
distribution of profits.67 In some cases, cash distributions begin after the
film has been released. All available cash is distributed on a monthly or
quarterly basis.
A potential investor is well advised to consider the possibilities for
resale of participation units. The recent establishment of the National
Partnership Exchange (NAPEX) in St. Petersburg, Florida, is one at-
tempt to provide a secondary market for the trading of publicly regulated
limited partnership units.6" Buyers and sellers are matched on behalf of
stock brokerage firms through the competitive auction market. Only
units of public syndicates regulated by the SEC are traded because they
are easier to analyze and are considered less risky than private offerings.
Since start-up fees for new syndications can amount to as much as
twenty-five percent of the initial unit purchase price, secondary market
purchasers are interested in "seasoned" or "used" public syndication
units with positive cash flows.69 Such "seasoned" units may sell at as
much as a fifty percent discount, reflecting not only start-up fees, but to
some extent the risk premiums required by secondary market purchas-
ers.7° Exceptional syndications which are doing well may sell at a pre-
mium. Units purchased on the secondary market from investors who
want to cash out are often repackaged in private limited partnerships and
resold to high-end investors.
B. The Model
In general, investors are interested in the after-tax return on invest-
ment, rather than the before-tax rate of return. The Net Present Value
(NPV) model is often used to evaluate and rank prospective investment
projects on a before- or after-tax basis.7 ' The general NPV model can be
written:72
67. Weber, supra note 4, at 70.
68. Ruth Ryon, Used Syndicate Shares Find Market, L.A. TIMEs, June 22, 1986, at VIII,
at I.
69. Id at 10.
70. Id.
71. WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 8, at 110.
72. LUSZTIG ET AL., supra note 7, at 180-81.
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- n CFt Residual ValueNPV = I + -
t=1 (1 + Rf)t  (1 + Rf)
n
where:
1) I is the uncertain initial investment
2) NCF t is the uncertain net cash flow in period t
3) Residual Value is the uncertain selling price of the asset at the end of
the holding period minus taxes due and unpaid debt
4) Rf is the expected risk-free rate for the investment period.
The uncertain net cash flow in period t, NCF,, is the difference be-
tween the annual cash net income plus non-cash expenses, less non-cash
income. This may result in negative tax liabilities, which may, in some
circumstances, be used to shelter other income, so that negative cash flow
before tax may provide positive cash flow for the investor on an after-tax
basis.
The probability that the NPV of an investment is positive can be
derived from:
7 3
P(NPV > 0) = 1 - fzo f(x) dx where
1) f(x) is the normal distribution function
2) Z 0-E(NPV)
o(NPV)
n E -(NCFt) E(I)
3) E(NPV)= 7.-E1
t=1 (1 + Rf) t
n n 14) o'(NPV) = [ iX j= bibj cov (NCF1 , NCFj) J1/
- . bi 2 (--'CFj) + 2 l:<TU bi bj cov (NCF, NCFj) I
1
5) bi =i
(1 + Rf) ; i=,2,...n
1
6) bi =
(1 + Rf) j ; j = 1,2...n
73. Id.
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By way of exemplary application, assume a limited partnership
formed before, during or after the production of the film, which enters
into an agreement with an independent producer to purchase worldwide
or territorial rights to a film for $5,000,000. The general partner puts up
ten percent and a thousand units are sold at $4,500 each. Three possible
revenue performance scenarios-good, normal and poor-are assumed.
The corresponding probabilities and total anticipated gross revenues for
each possible outcome are presented in Table 1.74 Revenue projections
over the seven-year economic life of the corresponding residual values,
the expected values E(NCFt) 75 and standard deviations a(NCFt)7 6 for
each possible outcome are presented in Table 2. The residual value is
estimated using a risk-free rate of ten percent."
74. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
75. LUSZTIG ET AL., supra note 7, at 181.
76. Id.
77. Assumed interest rate on seven-year riskless bonds.
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The expected Net Present Value, E(NPV), is $3,096,891 7S The suc-
cessive net cash flows are perfectly correlated and u(NPV) is given by
n a( NCF,)"
t=1 (1 + R) t
The probability"' of realizing a positive Net Present Value is approxi-
mately 0.70.
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) l after tax plus the effective tax
rates excluding and including the residual value are presented in Table 3.
The residual value is treated as recovered depreciation, which is essen-
tially equivalent to an interest-free loan, and the tax liability is calculated
at the respective tax rates. The IRR before tax, with and without the
residual value, is 57.882 and 57.383 percent respectively, supporting the
observation that the present value of the residual is not a significant fac-
tor in the investment decision process. Effective tax rates do not appear
to decline when the nominal tax rate increases, as would be expected.
This suggests that the depreciation allowance when the probability of
success is low may not be worth much to taxpayers in higher tax
brackets."4
78. E(NPV) = 6,750,000/(1.10) + 1,350,000/(1.10)' + 450,000/(1.10)' + 180,000/
(1.10) 4.  _
79. a(NPV) = 4,974,937/(1.10) + 994,987/(1.10)2 + 331,665/(1.10)
3 + 132,665/(1.10)4
+ 66,332/(1.10) 5 + 66,332/(1.10)6 + 397,995/(1.10) 7 = $5,967,087.
80. Z = (0 - 3,096,891)/5,967,634 = -0.52. Probability (NPV > 0) = 1 - 0.30 =
0.70. See LUSZTIG ET AL., supra note 7, at 182.
81. See WESTON & COPELAND, supra note 8, at 111.
82. 6,750,000/(1 + i) + 1,350,000/(1 + i) 2 + 450,000/(1 + i)3 + 180,000/(1 + 4 +
90,000/(1 + i)' + 90,000/(1 + i)6 + 540,000/(1 + i)7 - 5,000,000 = 0; i, the Internal Rate
of Return (IRR), = 57.8%.
83. 6,750,000/(1 + i) + 1,350,000/(1 + i)2 + 450,000/(1 + i)3 + 180,000/(1 + i)4 +
90,000/(1 + i) + 90,000/(1 + i) 6 + 90,000/(1 + i)7 - 5,000,000 = 0; i, the Internal Rate
of Return (IRR), = 57.3%.
84. See Grove, supra note 1; see also supra notes 4, 24.
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TABLE 3: INTERNAL RATE OF RETuRN
Excluding Including
Residual Value Residual Value
Before tax 57.3% 5 57.8%
86
After tax
T = 15% 48.5%87 49.6%88
Effective Tax Rate 9  15.4% 90  14.2%91
T = 28% 40.9%92 42.1%93
Effective Tax Rate94  28.6%
95  27.2%96
If the limited partners receive fifty percent9 7 of gross receipts plus
one hundred percent9" of the residual gross receipts value at the end of
the holding period, expected revenues for each possible outcome can be
calculated on a before- and after-tax basis, as presented in Table 4.99 Af-
ter-tax calculations are made including and excluding depreciation, as-
suming tax rates of fifteen " and twenty-eight 0 1 percent.
85. See supra note 83.
86. See supra note 82.
87. See supra notes 82 and 83 for examples of IRR calculations.
88. Id
89. Effective tax rate = (IRR before tax - IRR after tax)/(IRR before tax) X 100%.
90. (57.3 - 48.5)/(57.3) X 100% = 15.4%.
91. (57.8 - 49.6)/(57.8) X 100% = 14.2%.
92. See supra notes 82 and 83 for examples of IRR calculations.
93. Id
94. See supra note 89.
95. (57.3 - 40.9)/(57.3) x 100% = 28.6%.
96. (57.8 - 42.1)/(57.8) x 100% = 27.2%.
97. Assumed participation rate.
98. Id
99. Assumed tax rate.
100. Id
101. Id
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The IRR based on fifty percent 0 2 of the Expected Value of Gross
Receipts realized by the limited partners before tax is 5.3 percent. 0 3 The
general partner realizes approximately 59.5 percent"° before expenses.
The after-tax IRR realized by the limited partners increases from 5.6
percent,10 5 when the tax rate is fifteen percent,' °6 to 6.3 percent 10 7 when
the tax rate is fifty percent.108 When the depreciation deduction is ex-
cluded, the IRR is negative, suggesting that the project is not economi-
cally viable without the tax shelter component.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A major objective of the Tax Reform Act of 19861° was to shift the
emphasis in financial feasibility analysis away from the tax subsidy aspect
to considerations of economic productivity and viability. The future of
public film project offerings will depend on how well Wall Street, the
industry and the SEC can develop film projects at low front- and back-
end costs to make them attractive to prospective investors.
This article's practical guidelines, based on the techniques of capital
budgeting, can be used by individual investors to evaluate the financial
feasibility of MPLP's. Hopefully, it will prove useful to prospective in-
vestors, as well as film syndicators, managers and marketers, because it
provides a way of separating out the relative contribution of product pro-
ductivity, tax shelter and residual value to the return produced by a
MPLP. Revenue received in the early years is a major determinant of
return for all investors, whereas tax shelter is a less important considera-
tion for lower bracket investors. The residual value is not a significant
component of the rate of return in the present analysis. However, this
could change if the demand for "seasoned" films increases in the future.
The framework presented in this article could be extended to derive
a set of general mathematical relationships which could illuminate the
financing and/or participation relationship between the general partner
and the limited partners, in a context of various tax rates, depreciation
method schedules, revenues and debt financing. This framework could
form a basis for a new NPV-IRR Investment Section for inclusion in
SEC Registrations and Evaluations of Limited Partnership Prospectuses.
102. Assumed participation rate.
103. See supra notes 82 and 83 for sample calculations.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Assumed tax rate.
107. See supra notes 82 and 83 for sample calculations.
108. Assumed tax rate.
109. EVERETr T. ALLEN, JR. ET AL., PENSION PLANNING 340 (6th ed. 1988).
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A further application would examine the elasticity of the general-limited
partner substitution relationship, whereby the general partner's pre-tax
IRRs subsidize the limited partner's pre-tax IRRs. This substitution
would help to float pre-priced limited partnerships in the current period
of reduced IRS subsidization.
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APPENDIX: CRITICAL DATA
FIGURE 1: PROSPECTUS (MAIN COMPONENTS)
1. The Film Project
a) Subject of the Film
b) Film Producer - Track Record
c) Film Distribution
d) Film Synopsis
2. Film Production
a) The Production Schedule (FIGURE 2)
b) The Production Budget (FIGURE 3)
3. Film Marketing
4. Financial Analysis
a) Structure - Limited Partnership
b) Pro Forma Income Statement (FIGURE 4)
c) Residual Value Analysis
d) Tax Considerations
e) Other Considerations
(1) Right to Audit
(2) Liquidity
(a) Primary Market
(b) Secondary Market
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FIGURE 2: PRODUCTION SCHEDULE COMPONENTS
1. Research
2. Screen Writing
3. Final Pre-production
4. Shooting the Footage
5. Editing the Footage
6. Assembling the Composite Sound Track
a) Voice
b) Music
c) Sound Effects
7. Sound Mix
8. Negative Cutting
9. Answer Print
10. Print Publication
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FIGURE 3: PRODUCTION BUDGET COMPONENTS
1. Personnel
a. Research and Screen Writing
b. Director
c. Editors
d. Line Producer
e. Film Crew
f. Other
2. Camera Package
3. Lighting
4. Sets (Rental and Construction)
5. Studio Space (including Technicians)
6. Insurance Package
7. Legal Services
8. Editing Equipment
9. Music (All Costs of Final Tape)
10. Titles and Opticals
11. Film Stock and Sound Stock
12. Laboratory Work
13. Talent
14. Subtotal
15. Administrative Overhead (5% of Subtotal)
16. Contingency (8% of Subtotal)
17. Executive Producer (6-1/4% of Subtotal)
18. Total
19. Financing Fee (7.2% of Total in Line 18)
20. Total Budget
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FIGURE 4: PRO FORMA INCOME STATEMENT COMPONENTS
Revenue Breakout in Percentage
1. Domestic Film Rentals (40.3%)
2. Foreign Film Rentals (24.2%)
3. Network Television ( 8.4%)
4. Television Syndication ( 5.2%)
5. Pay/Cable Television (14.6%)
6. Video Cassette ( 5.2%)
7. Ancillary ( 2.1%)
Total Gross Revenues
- Distribution Fees
Gross Film Rentals
- Distribution Costs
Total Net Revenues
- Net Income to Partnership Before Tax
- Tax Liability
Cash Flow to Parnership After Tax
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